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RAFAEL BUSTOS
Contrary to the dominant literature and policy orientations, evidence from the Algerian
case in two periods of study suggests that no positive link exists between economic
liberalization and democratization. Instead, placing the focus on the content and
context of these processes reveals that they are seldom objectives in themselves.
Between 1988 and 1992, democratization was clearly instrumental in liberalizing the
economy and this proved to be fatal for both. As for the period 1994–99, economic
liberalization and democratization were complementary strategies aimed at keeping
the regime in place. Although they were successful in this goal, neither of them was
consistently implemented or pursued. 
Algeria has undergone several periods of political change since
independence. From 1981 onwards, political change has been accompanied
or preceded by economic liberalization.1 In this article we analyse two
periods of interrelated economic and political liberalization2 against the
background of the dominant literature, in order to verify whether political
and economic liberalization are linked in the way that this might lead us to
expect. The two periods of study are, first, the ‘democratic experiment’
between 1988 and 1992 and, second, the ‘recovery of the state’ between
1994 and 1999.
Several schools of thought in the study of democracy have stressed the
existence of strong links between economic liberalization and
democratization.3 This relationship is frequently presented in the form of a
‘positive’ correlation between democratization4 and economic liberalization.
In other words, democratization is supposed to develop after a process of
continuous or discontinuous economic liberalization. This is thought to
happen through the intermediate action of a national bourgeoisie.
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Equally, most recommendations on policy making for developing states
made by international economic organizations since the 1980s are based on
identical presumptions.5 Hence, governments are encouraged to liberalize
their economies and profit from the opportunities opened up to them by
globalization. This should unleash social and economic forces within the so-
called ‘civil society’,6 on the one hand, and weaken the authoritarian
features of the state, compelling it to adopt liberalization measures, on the
other hand. In due course, opening the economy to the market should bring
about more authentic pluralism7 and eventually democracy.
However, we contend that whenever economic and political
liberalization are clearly connected in the Algerian case, it is not in terms of
positive correlation, but rather in others such as ‘negative causality’,8
instrumentality and complementarity. Likewise, no evidence for the
common assumption that economic liberalization weakens the authoritarian
state can be found in the Algerian experience. On the contrary, during the
1990s episode, liberalization helped revive a withering authoritarian
regime. These conclusions drawn from doctoral research and analysis of
recent events suggest that theoretical speculation and policy
recommendations risk being empty and misleading if the real content and
context of economic liberalization and democratization are not carefully
examined. Meanings, intentions and circumstances can to a great extent
explain interactions between political and economic processes and why
their outcomes deviate from the expectations that had been raised.
Conversely, their omission may render current policy orientation for
developing countries counterfactual and ill-suited.
The ‘Democratic Experiment’ (1988–92)
As noted, this was the first time in Algeria’s recent history that political
change had been accompanied by economic liberalization. It was indeed the
first attempt to modify the components of the political system while at the
same time reducing state intervention in the economy. This was particularly
important because Algeria until then had been one of the most state-oriented
and economically nationalist countries in the Third World. For this reason,
political and economic changes involved a deeper reorientation, that of the
ideological position of the regime, both in the domestic and international
realms.
The First Economic Liberalization (1981–87)
This meaningful departure from fundamental ideological tenets had actually
started earlier, from the beginning of the 1980s, when a gradual and
prolonged effort to bring economic liberalization or infitah was set in train.
For several reasons, this gradualism was the only way available to push
forward a global reorientation. First of all, drastic change was not directly
justified by transformations in the international system. In fact, this
continued to be dominated by cold war confrontation and the weakening of
the Non-aligned Movement. Secondly, it was not caused by a switch in
domestic policies. Regime succession had been successful and the new
president had committed himself to pursuing his predecessor’s line.
Algeria’s infitah of the 1980s was rather the result of subtle realignments
both in the domestic and the international arenas. Algeria’s new president,
Benjedid, coming from a quite different background to that of Boumédiène,9
reflected the views and interests of an emerging local bourgeois sector by
which he had been influenced.10 Without formally abandoning socialist
principles, Benjedid opened new spaces to entrepreneurs and market agents.
The role of the private sector was redefined and incorporated into the
national plan.11
Internationally, the early 1980s saw an offensive on the part of the USA
and the United Kingdom in favour of neoliberal macroeconomic orthodoxy.
This new model, strongly propagated through influential forums, reached
and quickly permeated the international monetary institutions and diverse
political environments.12 It was mainly through this propagation that a
considerable number of technocrats and politicians in the Third World
became aware of an economic doctrine that was often in open contradiction
with their countries’ policies. In addition, from the second half of the 1980s
onwards, these technocrats and politicians were influenced by the Soviet
perestroika and widespread public sector restructuring in western Europe
[Talahite, 2000: 69].
Since Algeria officially held to an economic policy diametrically
opposed to that of the neoliberal discourse and no major factor justified a
dramatic revision of the government’s direction, reforms in the economic
realm had perforce to be piecemeal and unambitious, at least until 1987–88.
Furthermore, as the initiative for change came from within the regime and
lacked social support, it could hardly be implemented with diligence.
The dramatic fall in foreign currency revenues from 1986 on narrowed
the government’s margin for action. In view of these difficulties, the
president entrusted a group of state officials led by M. Hamrouche with the
task of preparing a thorough restructuring of the economy. This group of
reformers kept themselves discreetly in the background, largely protected
from frontal attacks by their enemies. They influenced some policies but
were unable to ensure their implementation. Since many decisions were
either blocked or slowed down, Hamrouche finally realized that succeeding
with the infitah ultimately depended on stealing a political march on his
opponents. 
It must be clarified that the promoters of economic reforms were not, as
has been affirmed, a group of ‘Chicago Boys’ [Tlemçani, 1999: 24–29], that
is, convinced neoliberals. Although they looked for support from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)13 and were influenced to some extent by
it, their economic strategy was nationalist in a double sense. Firstly, because
it provided for the state’s firm tutelage of liberalization. Secondly, because
it envisaged minimizing foreign interference on policy making by creditors
and international partners.
The Opening: A Quick and Astonishing Political Transformation (1988–89)
The Algerian political opening of the late 1980s and early 1990s had a
paradoxical character. On the one hand, many observers justly considered it
the boldest and most comprehensive democratization attempt in the Arab
world.14 On the other hand, it never became fully credible to the Algerian
population and political parties, despite the unprecedented spirit of freedom
it called forth. Elections, although relatively fair,15 never reached high rates
of participation and were boycotted by several parties.16
Events took place unexpectedly and swiftly. One of the most monolithic
single-party regimes in the Arab world was to shatter within a few months.
Everything started with the October 1988 riots. During five days some 20
towns in the country were scenes of revolt, causing great destruction, and
then saw hundreds of deaths in the brutal repression that followed. After
calm was re-established, the president announced important political
reforms. In a few months, what was formerly the sole political party, the
Front de Libération National (FLN), relinquished its political monopoly and
a more liberal constitution was passed. A multi-party system was
established, an ‘independent’17 press emerged and the army withdrew from
the FLN, assuming a more security-based role. However, as the promoters
of change were regime officials and this regime had become highly
discredited after the October 1988 riots, people reacted cautiously to the
changes. The lack of consultation with other actors from inside or outside
the regime reminded many of the authoritarian methods of the past.
Moreover, the reform team’s ignorance and even rejection of long-standing
demands from some of the most active social groups (Berber rights
activists, trade unionists, feminists and human rights campaigners) aroused
mistrust about their intentions.18
The legalization of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was a daring step
forward at that time and a matter of much controversy at a later stage.
Algeria became the first North African country and one of only a handful of
Arab nations to legalize an Islamist party. Most political forces and
observers who later favoured the interruption of the electoral process
reproached President Benjedid for his earlier decision to legalize the FIS, on
the basis that it violated the Constitution. While this is basically true, it
could also be applied to other legal Islamist parties (HAMAS, en-Nahda),19
to linguistically-oriented parties and even to secularist forces (PAGS and
RCD).20 Unfortunately, this important question was never submitted to
public debate and remains today a key, and unresolved, issue for
democratization.
Later, when democratization in Algeria failed, a fruitful debate arose
about the causes of failure and more generally about the obstacles for
democracy in the Arab world. An interesting issue in this debate was the
presence or absence of moderate or bourgeois sectors capable of sustaining
democratization.21 Some arguments emphasized either the lack of liberal
elites within Algeria [Djebaili, 1996: 154] or the weakness of the moderates
inside the FIS [Waterbury, 1994: 37–8; Mortimer, 1993: 38–40]. Others
pointed to the incapacity of secular forces [Maghraoui, 1992: 24]. Overall,
blame was put more on society than on the regime, which is indeed
arguable.22 However, by searching for structural faults these scholars
understated agency questions such as the legalization of the FIS or the
regime’s relations with the Islamist movement. In addition, they did not
ascertain whether the reformers had any basis of support. In the end this
aspect would be crucial.
Accelerating Economic Reform in the Face of Growing Opposition
(1989–91)
Democratization in Algeria coincided with a brief but accelerated period of
economic liberalization. Such liberalization meant a prolongation of the
measures adopted during the 1980s; their application, however, was deeper
and indeed unprecedented. Except for agriculture, the reforms introduced in
the 1980s had a very limited effect owing to strong resistance in state-
owned industrial and trading companies. A major hindrance was the
government’s inability to activate the key levers of the economy.
Consequently, public sector restructuring and the call for efficiency did not
bring the expected results. 
Nevertheless,  in September 1989, President Benjedid called in the team
of reformers led by Hamrouche to redress the economic crisis. Once the
reformers gained key positions in government, they targeted sensitive
centres within the productive and financial structure of the country. The
Money and Credit Law released the Central Bank from control by the
Ministry of Finance and allowed it to supervise commercial banks and the
Treasury, both net issuers of money and loans. Severe limits on public
borrowing were set for the first time. A different initiative formally
abolished military security’s information service (the DGPS),23 in charge of
filtering high officials’ recruitment [Abdelaziz, 1999: 73] and checking
economic transactions. New laws on trade unionism eliminated the socialist
organization of labour in the state sector and set up a classical liberal system
of plural representation and collective negotiation. Lastly, the Algerian
dinar was devalued, some food subsidies were removed and imports of
consumer goods were liberalized.
These and other measures, which destabilized the basic mechanisms of
the rentier and state-administered economy, came into force within a very
short timeframe. With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that they lacked
enough time and authority to be enforced. Economic reforms originated
from a government without electoral legitimacy.  In addition, they had been
contested during the 1980s by powerful sectors within the political,
administrative and economic apparatus. Hamrouche’s strategy of
combining political and economic liberalization would certainly not
eliminate ardent opposition. Since the reformers did not seek consensus, an
underground boycott was to be expected. A good illustration is provided by
the Ministry of Labour, which sent instructions to state companies, urging
them to maintain the socialist structure of representation rather than apply
the new legislation [Benamrouche, 1995: 53].
Outside Algeria, instability resulting from the end of the cold war and
the second Gulf War also played a role in hindering the reformist project.
Governments and private actors refused to take unnecessary risks at a time
when there was much to lose. When the Algerian government presented its
creditors and partners with an ambitious economic plan to refinance the
foreign debt based on the latest financial techniques (for example, the US
‘coupon zero’),24 the latter examined it very cautiously and delayed the
answer for several months [Corm, 1993: 23–4]. That time was critical for
the reformers’ government and it may well be that Algerian public
importers used their contacts among European (mostly French) insurance
companies to slow down the approval of the government’s plan.25 In fact,
both commercial and financial bureaucrats and foreign commercial partners
feared that reforms would harm long-established practices. Bureaucrats in
state companies were afraid of losing commercial monopolies; suppliers
dreaded being deprived of captive markets and banks disliked the idea of
switching high interest short-term loans for low interest long-term ones
[Corm, 1993: 23–4; Ghilès, 1998]. This reluctance prevented a quick
response. By the time the plan was finally passed, Hamrouche’s government
had already been dismissed. 
The Shortcomings of Political Reform (1988–91)
Political reforms carried out between 1988 and 1991 at first sight look
spectacular, especially considering the clear break with the past represented
by them.26 Nevertheless, when analysed in depth they prove to be
inconsistent. They were spectacular because they brought to an end the one-
party system, the monopoly on trade unionism, the supremacy of socialist
principles and state control of information, almost at a stroke. However
impressive they might seem, the political reforms were in many respects
inconsistent and prejudiced. Some freedoms and civil rights lacked
minimum guarantees while others were deliberately approved in order to
stymie long-standing socialist opponents of economic reform by allowing
other voices to speak louder. Moreover, they were not perceived as sincere
and fair by many groups in the opposition, but rather as strategic
calculations of the incumbents. These groups largely joined the process but
remained sceptical about their promoters. 
A liberal framework of norms and institutions was set up but it
possessed numerous shortcomings. First, legalization of Islamist, Berber
and secularist parties was in principle incompatible with the Constitution, as
we have seen. Second, very few preconditions had to be met to found
political parties, trade unions or newspapers. This offered the possibility of
participation to a wide spectrum of the population, but established no clear
delimitation of legal and illegal activities and provided no definition of non-
democratic functioning. Third, long-held ideological and organizational
tenets were discarded, but new ones were neither the fruit of internal
reflection nor of social demands. As a result, democratic procedures barely
permeated political organizations, and the courts and state were plunged
into confusion. In addition, the state’s legal and economic promotion of civil
society’s organizations (press, parties, associations, etc.) before these had
had time to mature created an exorbitant and artificial pluralism. Fourth,
civil rights, only recently recognized, lacked precise boundaries and
necessary guarantees. As soon as their exercise became controversial, the
government did not hesitate to repeal them.27 Fifth, freedom of the press was
granted but TV and the press remained state-controlled. Finally, electoral
laws allowed for voting delegation, under special circumstances and
between married couples, contradicting the basic democratic idea of ‘one
person, one vote’.
A greater flaw resided in the fact that the reforms could never shake off
the taint of the public’s suspicion. They created a multi-party system out of
a monolithic regime, but the monopoly of decision persisted. Constitutional
changes were not negotiated and therefore the rules of the transitional game
were seen as intrinsically biased. Some of them did in fact benefit certain
groups and ideological positions. Prejudiced measures included: material
and legal advantage for the FLN and the Algerian General Workers’ Union
(UGTA), a first-past-the-post electoral system penalizing small parties, a
press code favouring Arabic-language publications, a Constitutional Court
that could only be assembled by the president, and public funding for
journalists to leave the official press. Unfortunately, Algeria lacked a
prestigious figure impartial enough to act as an arbiter in disputes. President
Benjedid could not play this role because he was a long-standing supporter
of infitah. 
Tension and violence are not uncommon in transition processes. In the
Algerian context though, outbursts of violence were to mark decisive
moments in the course of reforms: the October 1988 riots were the ‘spark’,
the May–June 1991 clampdown on street occupations was the ‘turning
point’ and new eruptions of violence between January and March 1992
signalled the closure. The brutal repression of the October 1988 riots was a
particularly significant event. It dispelled the idealized image of the Army
as civilians were killed and torture was again practised in Algeria.
Furthermore, it fuelled the people’s demands for justice which, although
unsatisfied, activated a historically rooted tendency to resort to violence for
political purposes.28
The government’s  response to economic crisis did little to keep reforms
alive. People were suffering from a general shortage of goods owing to cuts
in imports, the removal of price subsidies and currency devaluation. Instead
of alleviating social unrest, the authorities asked the population to accept
greater sacrifices29 and deferred salary increases.30 Citizens should be
content just to enjoy the enhanced freedom since material benefits would
take longer, it was reasoned. Economic goals of budgetary balancing thus
prevailed over urgent social demands.
As for national and international mass media, they were not very
supportive of the whole process of reforms, conveying neither
encouragement of government initiatives nor confidence in the economy.
In 1988, Algerians only found out about the October riots through the
French media, given a news blackout in the domestic press. When the
foreign press was banned some time later, many in Algeria thought that
foreign media were still the most reliable source of information. So the
international (especially French) media became influential through satellite
television during the electoral campaigns, generally emphasizing the
Islamist threat. The national press and television too did little to ease the
tension by taking sides in the game of confrontation between the regime
and the Islamists.
Nor was diplomatic backing for the incumbents forthcoming from
foreign powers. In this sense, the second Gulf War complicated the
democratic efforts of Algeria. Early steps in democratizing the country had
been applauded by outside countries, then looked upon with ambivalence
after the FIS victory in the local elections of 1990 and finally neglected after
the Gulf War. Algeria’s official position during the war was one of
equidistance between Iraq and the international coalition, and support for a
negotiated solution. This stance obviously did not bring Algeria any post-
war recompense (unlike for other Arab countries, particularly Egypt and
Syria). On the contrary, urgent financial requests were not met and no
pressure was made to keep the reformers in place or to prevent military
intervention.
The End of Democratization and the Beginning of Political 
De-liberalization (1991–92)
If economic reform was arrested and finally aborted by bureaucratic
resistance and an evasive international response, the political opening was
interrupted and reversed by the government’s own mistakes. It clearly
subordinated credible democratization to the implementation of economic
policy. In doing so, Hamrouche followed an erratic course of tactical
individual approaches, instead of pursuing a global commitment concerning
the rules of the process and the timing of elections. Switches from one
political force to another left the government with no loyal actor to 
sustain it.
Hamrouche and the reformers were the brains behind the February 1989
democratic Constitution even though they held no executive responsibility
at the time. Likewise, the legalization of the FIS was completed only one
week before the reformers were nominated to government, but it was they
who had convincingly pushed forward this idea. In September 1989,
Benjedid and Hamrouche feared that power might be recovered by the
Boumedienist wing of the party. Rumours indicated that the recently
dismissed prime minister K. Merbah was planning to take over the Political
Bureau [Moha, 1993: 178] at the FLN congress to be held in November.
Boumedienists did not occupy key posts in the party but had started to
return since the late 1980s31 and could now profit from the new atmosphere
of freedom to regain former positions.
Most likely, Hamrouche overestimated the strength of the FLN left wing
and its potential for opposition to economic reforms. He calculated that the
Islamist movement, coming from a long anti-socialist struggle,32 would
counterbalance the FLN as well as the Communist and Berberist opposition,
not particularly sympathetic to liberalization.33 An Islamist trade union, if
legalized, would also silence the UGTA protests. This set of calculations led
the reformers to legalize the FIS and the Islamist union, the SIT. 
Meanwhile, the government failed to attract large sectors of the lower
and middle classes. These classes resented the government because of the
effects the economic policy had on them. Cuts in basic subsidies and the
dinar’s devaluation stirred up popular malaise. The middle and upper-
middle classes, for their part, rejected the government’s cultural and
ideological orientation. Old FLN values of Arab-Islamism, adopted by the
reformers, contradicted the new atmosphere of pluralism and were
contested by active sectors of the middle classes: francophile intellectuals,
Berber rights activists, secularists and feminists. Finally, government
criticism of the FLN’s record on planning and heavy industrialization
alienated the party’s elders and many sympathizers of Boumédiène’s
policies. On the whole, the reformers created a vacuum of support around
themselves.
The consequence was electoral defeat and a poor performance by the
FLN in the June 1990 local elections. To general astonishment, the FIS took
over most local and regional councils. But Hamrouche was not particularly
upset. He felt less constrained to accelerate the reforms and only had to
worry about being re-elected the following year. In the meantime, the
reformers could approach the Islamists and try to achieve a compromise to
ensure co-operation between central and local government. However, after
several rounds of negotiations, no substantial agreement was reached
between the FIS and the government. Although both sides had, objectively
speaking, a strategic interest in reaching some form of arrangement, various
obstacles prevented any enduring understanding. First, differences in
professional backgrounds and economic goals separated reformers from
Islamist leaders. Whereas the FIS majlis al-shoura was basically composed
of teachers and imams,34 seeking to emphasize commerce while bringing it
into line with Islamic precepts,35 the reformers were technocrats from the
ministries of Finance or Planning, seeking to establish a solvent and
deregulated economy.36 Secondly, the FIS could not claim exclusive control
over the commercial bourgeoisie, since this constituency was shared with
two other Islamist parties, HAMAS-MSP and en-Nahda. Thirdly, the Gulf
crisis and its aftermath intensified maximalist demands and sharply reduced
the chances of agreement.
As the crisis evolved, the FIS sided with Iraq and tapped into a massive
popular sentiment of solidarity with the Iraqi people. Meanwhile the
government had to maintain a difficult position of equilibrium between the
two contenders, as Algerians demanded more backing for Iraq. After the
war, the UGTA resorted to a two-day strike and pulled off a pay increase,
showing that the reformers were vulnerable to pressure. Seeing his power
erode, Hamrouche tried to recover the FLN’s constituency and prepare for
the summer legislative elections. But the FLN was now in poor shape after
electoral defeat and governmental attacks. So Hamrouche blatantly altered
the electoral law so as to minimize the FIS support and increase the FLN’s
odds. The FIS leadership and other parties were outraged. Feeling strong
enough, the FIS launched an indefinite strike, later transformed into the
occupation of streets with the intention to force a repeal of the law. The FIS
leaders Madani and Benhadj met with Hamrouche to address the crisis. But
neither of them could compromise on their positions. If Hamrouche
changed the electoral law, the FLN would probably lose to the FIS and his
government would be removed. If Madani and Benhadj accepted the law,
the FIS risked a serious setback and the majlis al-shoura might oust them.
In addition, the FIS felt too confident and irritated37 to make concessions. In
this situation, the Army intervened, breaking up the street occupation,
forcing Hamrouche to resign and proclaiming a military curfew.
At the critical moment then, the reformers found themselves isolated
and unable to restore calm by their own means. The Army’s intervention
was a turning point: economic reforms were halted and de-liberalization
was further pursued. Although the new prime minister, Ghozali, promised
fair legislative elections, public space was rapidly compressed. FIS
publications were suppressed, the movement’s leaders imprisoned and
street gatherings restricted. A media campaign was launched to discredit
the Islamist party and spread fear about it. The electoral law was again
modified and the Ministry of Interior was assigned the task of organizing
the elections, taking it away from town councils which were mostly in the
hands of FIS mayors. Interestingly, in the months before the elections,
strikes and labour conflict decreased but tension and polarization remained
high. The labour movement and some secularist organizations (mostly the
PAGS, UGTA and RCD) were particularly active in mobilizing support
against the Islamists.
Political de-liberalization38 reached its peak after the FIS emerged as the
first political force in the first round of the December 1991 general
elections. Despite losing over a million votes, the majority system placed
the main Islamist party on the verge of a comfortable victory. But before the
second round could take place, the president was forced to resign. By a legal
manoeuvre, the president of the Parliament was discarded as provisional
head of state, against the constitutional provision, and supreme power was
transferred to an advisory body composed of civilians and Army officials,
the High State Council. An explosion of violence added to the massive
imprisonment of FIS militants and mayors. This period ended with the
banning of the FIS and the dissolution of all the municipal governments 
it controlled.
A Critical Impasse (1992–95)
Between 1992 and 1995 Algeria went through a critical phase. Violence
reached a climax and many feared the breakdown of the state and military
defeat to the Islamist guerrilla groups.39 Politically, there was an enormous
vacuum of rules and institutions with neither a Constitution in force nor
elected legislative and executive bodies. The passing of the FLN, once the
only legal party, into opposition made normalization even more difficult.
Economically, the government tried in vain to avoid debt rescheduling, but
was compelled to announce a halt to payments in 1993. Socially, the
population suffered a dramatic loss of purchasing power and terrible
deterioration in their access to and quality of all public services and
facilities.40
Ironically, the 1990s had started with positive prospects for the Middle
East and North Africa. On the one hand, the end of the cold war and the
Arab–Israeli peace process were supposed to bring ‘peace dividends’ to all
the countries in the region. On the other, the New International Order was
sending encouraging signals for globalization and democratization. The
main financial institutions agreed on a single universal recipe for economic
growth and ‘good governance’ in what has been labelled the ‘Washington
Consensus’ [Williamson, 1993]. However, Algeria was immersed in
serious civil strife after years of negative economic growth, and was
clearly not in the best of conditions to face the enveloping effects of
globalization.
After 1995, when the most critical point in financial and military terms
had been overcome, the regime engaged in political and economic
transformation. This consisted mainly of approving a structural adjustment
programme and restoring a constitutional multi-party framework. Heavy
casualties in the civil confrontation and rapid impoverishment marked the
background to these changes, notwithstanding a softening of the conflict.
The Recovery of the State (1995–99)
The Reinvention of a Liberalized Authoritarian Order41
The reinsitutionalization of the Algerian regime in the second half of the
1990s revealed a complete absence of procedural and institutional
innovation vis-à-vis the 1989 democratizing effort. In fact, the 1996
Constitution was a carbon copy of that of 1989. Most of the functions
conferred on the president, the prime minister and the Parliament in the
1989 text were reproduced in the new constitution. Not even the role of the
Army changed constitutionally speaking, despite its leading role in the
ruling of the country. Even the methods used to establish these institutions
– government initiative, a minor role for the parties42 and popular
referendum – very much resembled former practices.
There was also remarkable continuity on the ideological plane. The war
regime appealed to the same ‘November 1954’ values proclaimed by the
authors of the 1992 coup. General Nezzar was indeed the man connecting
both events and discourses since he was a main actor in 1992 and then chose
General Zeroual for the position of head of state. Zeroual would carry out
the reinstitutionalization of the regime. The new legitimizing values
revolved around three central ideas: patriotism, republicanism and
democracy. Their precise meanings are specific to the Algerian context and
must therefore be explained. ‘Patriotism’ is the antithesis of terrorism; the
so-called ‘patriots’ are state-armed militias operating in rural areas to fight
Islamist forces. ‘Republicanism’ is an evasive concept, whose concrete
meaning must be searched for in the French intellectual tradition. It refers
exactly to the supremacy of politics over religion. In Algeria, this translates
into a political authority free from religious scrutiny. However, this
independence from religious supervision does not imply, contrary to the
French secular model, that political authorities cannot use religious
vocabulary and reasoning to legitimize themselves. Finally, ‘democracy’
basically relates to those parties supporting the decision to cancel the
elections and the regime’s option for armed repression and exclusion of the
FIS. Parties like the FFS or the PT that opposed the cancellation are not
automatically involved in this category, whereas others radically against the
FIS and loyal to the regime, even if they are also of Islamist ideology
(Hamas/MSP) are readily considered democratic. The enemy of democracy
is ‘medieval totalitarianism’, which some Army officials and secularists
depict the FIS and its supporters as practising.43
Institutional order was completed by the election of the president of the
republic (1995) following the dissolution of the High State Council (1994)
as the highest authority. The full figure of the president was restored along
with wide-ranging powers. Nevertheless, he continued to be nothing more
than a modern ‘despot without freedom’.44 Despite the numerous
constitutional prerogatives he received, the president was always forced to
obtain general acquiescence from the elite factions (clans within the Army,
public sector and official parties) before making crucial decisions.
Furthermore, matters of sovereignty such as the peace settlement, foreign
and defence policy and privatization required a narrower consensus among
principal actors. Finally, the question of presidential succession remained an
exclusive prerogative of the Army, through informal but firmly-rooted
procedures.
The restoration, albeit with minor changes, of the 1989 Constitution and
the previous institutions took place in an authoritarian context in which
some limited pluralism had been consolidated. These were small areas of
freedom that were left untouched by the war regime. Limited pluralism
flowed from a diverse and outspoken press, more genuine trade unionism
and a range of more mature political parties. Direct critiques of political
personnel including the president himself were common  in the press. The
labour movement disentangled itself from strict allegiance to the state, and
members of political parties were becoming progressively used to open
debate and free elections as means of resolving disputes. However,
the real impact of these advances was restrained by several factors. First,
war and social crisis have lowered participation to minimal levels.45 Second,
each of these channels of expression (press, unions and parties) worked in
an unstable and unclear legal framework. The press was threatened
by an intimidating penal code, severely punishing ‘speech offences’.46
New unions could not compete with the former single union (UGTA), which
still received preferential treatment by the state. Finally, political parties
were constrained to act loyally towards the regime through fear of being
banished since the law was intentionally ambiguous on the boundaries of
legality.47
Although further liberalization has thus far been prevented, some
changes have occurred in the functioning of the new authoritarian regime
as compared to the single-party system. First, social and political control is
no longer executed through the FLN (which spent a long time in opposition
and was then weakened) but through the ‘pluralist’ channels referred to
above. Press, unions and parties circulate an acceptable ideology, a suitable
version of the war, while they help contain social and labour conflict. But
a society in anomie and decomposition, as is the case of Algeria, needs
stronger mechanisms of social control and discipline. These are provided
by moral discourse and especially by armed institutions such as the Army,
the militia and the Islamist groups. Each of them fights to impose on the
population absolute allegiance to its cause under the ever-present threat of
death.
Second, the function of representation is evolving a new and more
complex nature. The previous one-party system of representation proved to
be devoid of substance and has given way to a set of fluid relations difficult
to evaluate. A critical overview of trends in representation in Algeria is
nevertheless possible if we deal with ‘disaggregated’ concepts. Political
representation can be broken down into two basic components:
participation and accountability. Participation, as discussed above, had
fallen despite the existence of liberal channels for political expression.
Political parties exemplify this tendency perfectly: despite a decade of
consolidation, none of them yet possesses a stable basis of support.48
Distrust in conventional forms of political representation is endemic in
Algeria and will last at least as long as civil conflict is unresolved. This is
one of the reasons why people desert those channels of participation and
follow others or no channel at all. Alternative courses for political
expression are for the most part non-institutional, such as tribal village-
based platforms (Kabylia), street riots over several causes of popular unrest
(water shortages, housing allocation, etc.) and at sporting and musical
venues. Often too, individual behavior evinces an outright rejection of
politics and institutions, as can be seen by drug addiction, media alienation
and delinquency.
As for accountability, there have been contradictory patterns. On the
one hand, a new political culture has been born denouncing abuses of
power, demanding inquiries and politicians’ dismissal and prosecution.
The press has been particularly active in this respect. On the other hand,
little judicial and political action has been undertaken to curtail corruption
and most political scandals have remained unresolved [Hadjadj, 2001:
302–5]. The judicial system is the target of attacks even by the president
himself, who is always announcing a thorough reform of the judicial
system. At the same time, more and more areas of the public agenda have
escaped the mechanisms of checking and supervision. To the old opaque
areas of defence and hydrocarbons, must now be added those of
privatization and war crimes (massacres, disappearances, etc.).
Unsurprisingly, there is an increasing feeling among the population that
real decision-making over many key issues is now harder to control than it
was before.
A third realm of political transformation is that of informal politics.
This has grown larger not only in the area of grass roots action, but also in
high-level policy-making. Two facts have strengthened this latter trend.
First, financial and economic pressures from abroad have accelerated the
‘transnationalization of the state’ in Algeria.49 In spite of deceptive
appearances and discourses, the Algerian economy has always been fully
part of the international capitalist market, being tightly linked to it by oil,
credit, technology, capital and consumer goods. This (inter)dependency
intensified in the 1990s because of new pressing needs: debt-rescheduling,
the search for foreign investment and the purchase of anti-guerrilla
weaponry. This, in turn, has multiplied the frequency and relevance of non-
institutional meetings, either casual rendezvous between politicians or
work interviews between high bureaucrats. Both sorts of meetings are of
course beyond public scrutiny. It is also the case of international business
meetings, negotiations with EU or IMF officials, and personal visits of the
Algerian president in quest of foreign investment.50
A second factor facilitating the expansion of informal politics has been
the rise of the Army to direct political command. Prior to 1989, the Army
stayed backstage, rarely speaking in public. Since then and especially with
the start of the armed conflict, it has moved to the fore and assumed
political responsibility.  Ex-military officers (with the exception of
Bouteflika) occupy presidential posts, while succession and peace
initiatives have come necessarily from the Army. Meanwhile their
spokesmen vindicated the decision to halt the elections and responded to
accusations of negligence. As the Army gets more involved in daily policy-
making, personal differences within its leadership become keener and more
evident. Yet, they remain beyond institutional control.  Contacts among
key military officials take place not only on the General Staff Council but
primarily outside it, in the context of business and family relations.
Thirdly and lastly, economic liberalization in the 1990s has given an
impulse to existing patron-client networks in that importers out to make
quick profits have been encouraged to compensate for the state’s loss of
distributive capacities. Yet, since obtaining an import licence depends on
having the right contacts in the administration, powerful figures can easily
become patrons of commercial clienteles. This is only one way whereby
clienteles have been reconstructed and have grown in force. In their
expansion, clienteles are able to absorb and reconcile elite factions that
were formerly rivals.51 At the same time, this informal dimension of
politics and economic management is increasingly visible to the public,
which rightly questions the role and efficiency of political institutions. On
balance, the prospects for democratization look gloomy and cynicism is
widespread.
Foreign-led Economic Liberalization (1994–99)
Economic liberalization in Algeria deepened in the second half of the 1990s,
driven by the structural adjustment programme (SAP), applied between 1994
and 1999, and different pressures coming from globalization (the arrival of
new information technologies and negotiations for a free trade agreement).
Unlike the earlier infitah, which was basically an  internal adjustment,
liberalization was in the 1990s became a foreign-led attempt to restructure
the economy. Failure to achieve internal adjustment, epitomized in the 1993
interruption of payments, led Algeria to accept  debt rescheduling and
external conditionality.
The SAP was an unwanted option that the Algerian authorities had
always tried to avoid. They were fully aware of how difficult it would be to
justify this decision to the populace after decades of fervent nationalist and
anti-imperialist discourses. This political obstacle would obviously
manifest itself in the opaque implementation and unsatisfactory results of
the SAP. Nevertheless, financial institutions have assessed Algeria’s
application of the SAP in very positive terms [Benabdellah, 1999: 25]. In
fact, macroeconomic variables have been balanced and the country has
accumulated enough foreign reserves to make repayments for several years.
Algeria can now repay its debt52 and that is why its authorities have declined
to renew the SAP, against IMF advice. However, its solvency is extremely
fragile and will not allow the government to relaunch economic activity
through public investments. 
The recent surplus in the balance of payments is due almost exclusively
to stable oil prices [Benabdellah, 1999: 26–27] rather than to good
economic management. On the other hand, the weight of debt servicing and
war expenses (25 per cent of the budget)53 prevents the state from promoting
investments that are needed to reactivate a severely damaged socio-
economic fabric. While national and international private investors keep
aloof, capital inflows cannot compensate for the reduction in public
spending.
An explanation for this apparent paradox of the adjustment – official
praise but real vulnerability – can be found in the methods and conditions
surrounding the liberalization process. We have already considered the
obstacle of public opinion. Another negative circumstance is constituted by
the objective difficulties of carrying out privatization in the public sector.
Ironically, Algeria has an enormous public sector, potentially transferable to
private ownership, but in fact very hard to sell. The excessive size of
production units, the obsolescent equipment and over-employment make
the sale of substantial parts of the public sector highly problematic.
Confusion has also hindered the implementation of reforms. Several
pieces of legislation dealing with restructuring and privatization were
passed in a short period of time and there were at least four political
authorities responsible for co-ordinating the reforms.54 Although all the
legal texts set ambitious objectives in the short term, in practice their
application has been terribly slow. Elite factions fighting over the most
lucrative parts of the public sector (land, commercial enterprises, consumer
goods factories, etc.) caused this delay. This struggle, only resolved by
lengthy bargaining, paralysed the functioning of the administration and
therefore the reforms.
Finally, violence has had a strong impact on the nature of privatization.
In general, it has accelerated privatization but in predatory conditions. This
is the case of public transportation and cultivated land around Algiers.
Attacks on state buses and facilities have been reported to precipitate sales
of this service to private companies, which once in charge seem to neglect
their duties [Martínez, 1998: 192–94]. Also, dreadful massacres in the rich
Mitidja agricultural area could be related to the expulsion of small farmers
from the last remaining public properties.55 In this respect, uncertain
property rights inherited from colonization and nationalization complicate
even more the issue of land transfers.
The termination of the SAP in 1999 left behind important gaps. Fiscal
and banking reform received only marginal attention and most importantly,
state restructuring is still pending. As long as these issues are untouched, the
remaining aspects of the SAP will only have limited effects. Foreign
investments for example suffer particularly from a rather discouraging
environment, except for hydrocarbons and a few other sectors such as
pharmaceuticals and fertilizers [Day, 2001: 188–89]. Algeria is losing the
race to attract international capital,56 along with other countries in the region
that cannot compete with fast developing areas of the world.57 Moreover,
this is despite the fact that Algerian presidents Zeroual and Bouteflika have
made great efforts to attract foreign investment, including the conclusion of
an association agreement with the EU providing for greater financial co-
operation.
Regarding this association agreement with the EU, signed in 2001,58
Algeria’s main interest has always been the prevention of terrorism and not
free trade. This is why the agreement was reached after lengthy negotiations
and includes an important clause providing for international co-operation
against terrorism. Unlike its neighbours (Morocco and Tunisia), Algeria is
not primarily interested in lifting tariff protection and preparing for a Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area due to start in the year 2010. Rather, it is
mostly concerned with obtaining political and police commitments to
repress terrorism from its main partners, which are also vital havens for
Islamist rebels.59 In this sense, the inclusion of a specific clause on terrorism
in the agreement can be seen as an important victory for the Algerian
regime. European countries which have until recently advocated a
negotiated settlement to the conflict are now implicitly acknowledging the
legitimacy of the Algerian authorities and their use of coercive means to end
the confrontation.
Finally, the introduction of new information technologies, based on
digital technology such as wireless and cordless telephones, computer
services and (in)direct satellite transmissions,60 was expected to foster
pluralism and economic growth in the entire Middle Eastern and Northern
Africa region, as everywhere else. While economic effects so far are
positive although modest, the political consequences are at best uncertain.
Regimes in the Maghreb are in control of the number and speed of licence
concessions for Internet servers [Kavanaugh, 1998: 104–5]. If new
technology communication is contained within certain limits, then contents
and Internet messages can be checked by regime agencies. Internet and
cellular servers as well as booster stations for indirect satellite transmissions
can be shut down if they are deemed to be troublesome [Kavanaugh, 1998:
105–6]. Overall, there remains some space for free communication which
will probably become harder to monitor as more information is channelled
through wireless hardware (mobiles, etc.) and direct satellite television
[Kavanough, 1998: 105–6]. Their democratizing impact has yet to be seen.
Conclusions
The dominant literature and policy-making orientations take for granted that
economic liberalization is conducive to political liberalization and to
democratization. However, evidence from the Algerian case in two periods
of study suggests that such statements should be revised and may be
discarded as valid bases for generalization or policy recommendation.
Instead, we contend that more attention needs to be paid to content and
context in order to understand economic and political interactions as well as
their outcomes. Content and context primarily reveal that economic
liberalization and democratization are seldom objectives in themselves, but
rather are strategies that frequently depend on each other (instrumental) or
both on external imperatives (complementary).
In our piece of analytical research, we found that there is indeed a strong
relationship between economic and political change, but that it does not
occur in the normally expected sense. A positive correlation between
economic liberalization and democratization is absent and neither a
bourgeoisie nor a strong civil society emerged as a consequence of
economic liberalization. Concerning the first period of interrelated change
(1988–92), we argue that it was the failure in economic liberalization, and
not its success, that indirectly led to democratization (‘negative causality’).
Then, political changes were conceived and executed paying excessive
attention to economic goals. This instrumentality of democratization turned
into a serious inconsistency causing the reversal of both economic and
political reforms. For the second period (1994–99), we contend that
economic liberalization (basically structural adjustment) and political
change (‘liberal’ reinstitutionalization) were complementary strategies
aimed at saving the regime from total collapse. Contradicting prevalent
assumptions, the Algerian state did not become weaker with foreign-led
liberalization to the benefit of civil society: on the contrary, it recovered its
strength and its control over social mobilization. Apparently, adjustment
and reinstitutionalization were successful and the state’s survival was
ensured. Nevertheless, they were carried out incompletely, on a predatory
basis and lacking real commitment, thereby leaving the country with a more
vulnerable economy and great cynicism regarding democracy.
The prospects of democratization and liberalization in Algeria are
obviously not bright, but some advance can be made if lessons are drawn
from previous mistakes. First, democratization must be credible and this has
much to do with how and what initial measures are adopted. Authoritarian
and biased methods send signals that provoke suspicion. Second, a
supportive international environment for political change is vital; that is,
one prepared to accept unforeseen results as well as those hoped for. Third,
no far-reaching economic reform will succeed if it is imposed, cunningly
masked or implemented without previously democratizing the state. Lastly,
democratizing the state also means defining and delimiting the role of the
Army in government, the use of religion in politics and the form of public
intervention in the economy. The resolution of these issues by the Algerian
political class is crucial for the country’s future.
NOTES
1. Economic liberalization can be defined as a general policy orientation comprising a
reduction in the state’s economic role, recognition of private economic liberties and a
stronger functioning of internal and external market mechanisms.
2. Political liberalization is currently defined as the process of extending citizens’
opportunities for autonomous action away from the state by guaranteeing individual and
collective civil rights. See O’Donnell and Schmitter [1986: 7].
3. Early modernization theorists have tended to link economic advancement and political
development, normally implying liberal democracy [Randall and Theobald, 1985: 2;
Ehteshami and Murphy, 1996: 10–11]. Departing from determinism, renowned political
scientists and sociologists have pointed to social prerequisites for democracy. In this vein,
R. Dahl specified that a ‘pluralist’ society ‘with a number of autonomous groups and
organizations, especially in the economic realm’, is conducive to a polyarchy [Dahl,
1992: 301]. S. Huntington [1994: 71] observed that the creation of open economies with
non-state economic agents and middle classes were one of the factors behind the ‘third
wave’ of democratization. Political economists have also connected a reduction in state
intervention in favour of the private sector with better chances for democratization. J.
Waterbury [1997: 166], for example, sees better prospects for democracy now because
‘states must concede greater accountability in exchange for shifting the burden of social
costs directly to their citizens’.
4. Democratization represents a step further than political liberalization. It refers to the
actual empowerment of citizens by means of larger political participation and better
representation, greater competition and higher accountability of the authorities. This
definition synthesizes the ideas on democratization of Dahl [1992], Korany et al. (eds.)
[1998] and O’Donnell and Schmitter [1986].
5. In 1981, the World Bank issued the Berg Report, which advocated the need for a radical
change in the strategy of development. The report lay down the basis for ‘economic
conditionality’ of international financial assistance, by subordinating the renewal of
assistance programmes in Africa to the fulfilment of structural adjustment plans. These
plans included import liberalization, currency devaluation, cuts in state expenditure and
public subsidies [Rodríguez-Piñero, 2000: 231]. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, an
implicit agreement in the Bretton Woods institutions emerged about the conditions for
‘good governance’, basically a minimal liberal state, in what came to be called the
‘Washington Consensus’ [Williamson, 1993].
6. Dodge [2002: 174] has convincingly argued that a clear distinction between public and
private, state and society is ‘fragile’ in the Middle East and North Africa because markets
still depend a lot on the states that created them.
7. For the debate on pluralism, see Haddad [1995, 1996].
8. This means that the main force behind democratization in the Algerian case is not success
in economic liberalization but rather its failure.
9. Benjedid was the son of a prosperous farmer, whereas Boumédiène came from a poor
peasant family. While the former was well known for his enjoyment of life and lively
looks, the latter was a very austere and rigorous man as his physical appearance always
revealed.
10. Benjedid had been commander in chief of the fith military region (Wahran) since
independence, where an active business sector had been developing.
11. This was done through a resolution of the Central Committee of the FLN (1982), a
revision of the National Charter (1986) and several laws adopted during the 1980s.
12. See for example S. Gill’s work [1991] on the role of the Trilateral Commission as a
vanguard and active political and economic forum in the 1980s and the 1990s.
13. Moreover, reformers probably acted under pressure to show the international community
a more democratic picture of Algeria. This, they probably thought, would improve their
own bargaining position on financial issues.
14. See, for example, Hudson [1991].
15. Vote delegation was largely used in the first elections while one million voting cards were
not delivered during the second ones.
16. Turn-out was approximately 65 per cent for the local elections in June 1990 and 59 per
cent for the first round of the legislative elections in December 1991. The FFS and MDA
were some of the parties boycotting the first round while eight others, mainly the PAGS-
Ettahadi, boycotted the second poll.
17. The government assured three-year salaries for journalists leaving the state-owned press
to fund new newspapers [Kraemer, 2001: 75]. This ‘independent’ press still relied on
public advertising and press-printings [Mouffok and Chaulet, 1992: 50]. Privately-owned
newspapers took off very slowly because of the low profits associated with conventional
media [Mouffok and Chaulet, 1992: 55].
18. O’Donnell and Schmitter  [1986: 10–11] have pointed out the importance of credibility in
the success of transitions to democracy.
19. HAMAS is an Arabic word meaning fervour and is the acronym of the Arabic words
Movement of the Muslim Society, later renamed the Movement for Society and Peace
(MSP). It is a national-based Islamist party close to the Muslim Ikhwan in Egypt. En-
Nahda (resurgence), whose complete name is Movement of the Islamic Nahda (MNI),
represents an Eastern-based Islamist party led by Sheikh Jaballah. In 1999, the MNI split,
leading to the creation of the Movement for National Reform (Harakat al-Islah al Watani,
MRN), opposed to participation in government.
20. PAGS stands for Partie de l’Avant-garde Socialiste and is the successor of the Algerian
Communist Party (PCA). The Union for Culture and Democracy (RCD) is one of the two
Kabyle parties and has a distinctive secularist stance, the other being the Front de Forces
Socialistes (FFS) led by Ait Ahmed.
21. O’Donnell and Schmitter [1986] provided a theoretical model for transitions in which
moderates in the opposition made an implicit or explicit pact with soft-liners in the
regime.
22. Exceptions here included were Entelis and Arone [1992: 34–5]. L. Addi and G. Martín
Muñoz have also criticized the Army for interrupting the electoral process.
23. Direction Générale de la Prévention et la Sécurité, belonging to the Army’s political
police (Sécurité Militaire).
24. Used for example in the Mexican financial crisis of 1988; see Corm [1993: 23].
25. This idea is implied in Corm’s argument and also in Ghilès [1998].
26. A well-known specialist on Algeria, G. Martín Muñoz [1990: 261] named this break
‘Algeria’s Third Republic’.
27. This happened when the Islamist movement resorted to indefinite street occupations to
protest against electoral gerrymandering. The regime responded by repressing these
gatherings, depriving the FIS of its press organs and imprisoning its leaders.
28. Violence was quite frequently used in Algerian recent history and viewed as a legitimate
form of action. For example, during Abdelqadir’s resistance against French colonial
occupation, during el-Moqrani’s rebellion and again during the war for independence
(1954–62). In all three cases, legitimation came among other sources from religious
authorities when they were not themselves at the battle front (Abdelqadir and el-Moqrani
were Sufi leaders as well as military leaders).
29. Prime minister Hamrouche literally said that people would not have to go through
bloodshed again but only through tears. See D. Vandewalle, ‘Rupture avec le socialisme:
Liberalisation et privatisation économique en Algérie’, Naqd 7 (1994), p.20.
30. Salary increases were agreed between the UGTA and the government, but actual rises
were delayed and partially applied, provoking worker unrest and a general strike in March
1991 [Benamrouche, 1995: 52].
31. Two influential ones were A. Bouteflika and S.A. Ghozali.
32. The Algerian Islamist movement opposed socialism during the 1960s and 1970s,
especially condemning land confiscation.
33. The Berberist parties normally identify themselves with social democratic values, even if
the FFS is slightly more left wing.
34. 21 out of the 33 members of the FIS executive organ (the majlis al-shoura) formed in
1989 were either teachers or imams; another six were merchants [Cheurfi, 2001:
499–500].
35. The FIS electoral programme emphasizes the role of trade and the regulation by Islamic
laws of commercial and financial activities. Agriculture and industry are treated with
much more vagueness; they should be based on small units of production and oriented to
the national market (excerpts from the programme can be found in Al-Ahnaf et al. [1991:
179–88]).
36. Roberts [1996: 128-29, 137-41] underlined the dilemma faced by the FIS, torn between
its goal of social justice and support for the government’s line of financial adjustment.
37. While the FIS was manipulated into the regime strategy, according to Roberts [1994], it
might have then realized the stratagem and become more antagonistic towards the
government.
38. A concept we owe to Eberhard Kienle [2001: passim].
39. At that time a report prepared for the US Army was delivered by the influential Rand
Corporation, assessing Algeria’s chances of becoming an Islamist republic. See Fuller
[1996].
40. Unsurprisingly, Algeria’s position in the Human Development ranking is stuck and shows
poor capacity to convert economic income into better living conditions (IDH ranked 109
and PIB/PPP ranked 94, in 1997). In that year 28.8 per cent of the population lived below
the poverty line [Benyoub, 1999: 125].
41. Borrowed from Noura Hamladji [2002].
42. Parties were consulted before the adoption of the Constitution, but the main parties’
demands, as expressed in the San Egidio platform and the Calling for Peace of 1996, were
basically ignored.
43. For example, Ali Haroun, one of the members of the High State Council, explained that
the coup was intended ‘to save Algeria and democracy from the threat of falling into the
darkness of a several centuries old theocracy’ [Nezzar, 1999: 8].
44. This idea of a ‘despot without freedom’ is taken from several descriptions of the Algiers
Dey during the Ottoman period. In particular, H.-L. Etienne states that the Dey was
sometimes powerless to extract taxes from inland tribes. Another article on ‘North
Africa’ affirms that the Dey was chosen from among and by the janissary officers, who
watched over his private life and prevented him from leaving Algiers so that he could not
claim any right over his succession. Despite this fact, the Dey ruled without restriction on
all other matters. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2000, ‘Dey’ and ‘Bey’ entries; and H.-
L. Etienne, ‘North Africa, History’, Encyclopaedia Britannica 24 (1992), p.959.
45. In the last legislative elections (May 2002), electoral abstention stood at 46 per cent, that
is, even higher than in the controversial first round election of 1991 (41 per cent) (www.
algeriainterface.com, 31 May 2002).
46. The law of 16 May 2001 reformed the penal code and introduced prison and money
penalties for offending by word or drawing high civil servants, politicians or the Army
[Kraemer, 2001: 82–3].
47. The 1997 electoral law in application of the 1996 Constitution prohibits the creation of
parties on a religious, linguistic or regional basis; they are not allowed to issue manifestos
containing ideas threatening the country’s identity, sovereignty or the democratic and
republican character of the state. The interpretation and judgement is left to the
Constitutional Court, an organ whose composition is clearly dominated by presidential
choice. The president appoints three of its nine members and two others are designated
by the Senate, one-third of which is also nominated by the president.
48. So-called ‘moderate’ Islamist parties (MSP/ex HAMAS and MNI/ex en-Nahda), that is,
those legalized and more or less loyal to the regime, have failed to attract most of the FIS
electorate while achieving irregular results between the 1997 and the 2002 general
elections. On the other hand, Kabylia-based parties (FFS and RCD) have recently been
bypassed by other forms of representation, the ‘ourouch’ or tribally-based committees,
acting quite independently from either Kabyle party. As for the nationalist-conservative
FLN and RND (Rassemblement National Democratique), they have exchanged a great
number of votes between the two elections, something that has more to do with the choice
of official candidate for the Presidency than with voter preferences. Finally, leftist parties
such as the Communist (PAGS, then MDS, now Ettahaddi) and the Trotskyist (PT) parties
have very limited constituencies for intellectual and ideological reasons, which prevent
their social bases from growing.
49. Transnationalization of the state can be defined as the process whereby the state’s structure,
functioning and its measure of efficiency result from its adaptation and response to
transnational capital stimuli. Transnationalized states modify their organization, personnel,
orientation, priorities and even their centres of influence and decision to become more or less
receptive and regulatory vis-à-vis transnational capital. Richard Cox, cited in Gill [1991:
46–47]. 
50. President Bouteflika is a well-know traveller. He has tried to exploit his former experience
as a business consultant to Gulf countries’ companies while he worked in Switzerland, to
attract investment to Algeria. This is the main reason behind many of his trips.
51. The reappearance of elements linked to the late Benjedid regime in current Algerian
institutions, along with Boumedienist figures close to Bouteflika, reveals that clienteles
can bring together apparently irreconcilable segments of the leadership. 
52. Foreign currency reserves have evolved in very positive terms from $2.67million in 1994,
$4.23million in 1996 and $7.21million in 1998 to $11.91m in 2000 (The Middle East and
North Africa Yearbook 2002, London: Europa Publications, p.196). 
53. In 1999 the interest payments amounted to 126.4 out of 961.7 thousand million Algerian
dinars, that is 13.14 per cent of the budget (ibid.). Military expenses in 1998 represented
$1.75 out of $14.9 billion, that is 11.74 per cent of the budget, according to Shail Feldman
and Yiftah Shapir [2001: 88].
54. These are the minister of industries and restructuring, the minister of participation and
coordination of reforms, the prime minister and the president of the republic. To illustrate
this clash of tasks, it can be useful to look at former prime minister Ahmed Benbitour,
who complained in his letter of resignation about presidential interference and accused
the president of violating the Constitution.
55. Massacres in Algeria have been occurring since 1996. Although the main reason behind
the 1997 escalation of massacres was the sudden and incomplete change of control in
certain areas and subsequent acts of revenge for defection [Kalyvas, 1999: 243 and
passim], land privatization, which began in 1998, may have triggered violence with
ulterior motives in the region, owing to its attractiveness and unclear regulation. 
56. Current statistics on foreign direct investment in North Africa show first that Algeria has
fallen well behind Morocco and Tunisia and second that Algeria largely remained static
in the period 1985–99 despite opening up to oil investment (The Maghreb Report 45, 3rd
quarter of 2002, p.31).
57. According to R. Wilson [2002: 193], the MENA region became further removed from
major international exchanges during the 1990s. The member countries lost weight both
in terms of global trade and foreign investment.
58. In December 2001, Algerian and EU authorities initialled this agreement. Formal
signature and parliamentary ratification was due in 2002 (D.S. Lewis (ed.), Keesing’s
Record of World Events 2001, Cambridge, UK and Washington, DC, Vol. 47).
59. Islamist leaders in exile are principally established in the United States, Germany, the
United Kingdom, France and Spain. France ceased being the main Islamist haven after the
1995 bomb attacks on the Paris underground drastically changed France’s approach to the
Algerian conflict.
60. Indirect satellite television requires booster stations to repeat and amplify the signal
whereas direct satellite transmission does not need booster stations and programmes
arrive without interference.
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